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LAWYERS AND JURISTS 
O.F. Robinson* 
 
Alan and I have known each other since before 1966; were it not for him I 
should never have become a romanist, and indeed I was originally his 
Assistant.  Since then he has propounded, we have argued, I have agreed, and 
disagreed.  I can only describe Alan Watson as il mio padrone.  I hope he 
will enjoy this look at the imperial garb. 
“We may be surprised, though, that such great legal 
development could be due to a few jurists chosen from such a 
small section of the population.”  
-Watson, Law-Making1  
Many books on Roman law make very similar statements. There are 
questions arising from it that have been vexing me for decades. How many 
jurists were there, ever?  How many jurists were there at any one time?  (A 
critical mass is surely needed before there is acceptance by one’s peers, 
before a ius commune can be created.)  How many aspirants were there?  
What differences were there in authority between the jurists of the Republic 
and of the Empire?  To find some answers I make use of the leading English 
textbook on the historical background to Roman law and its legal science,2 
and of the two still indispensable works on the Roman jurists.3  
The methodological problems in looking for answers to these questions 
are enormous.  Even before we consider the nature of the available evidence, 
there is the problem of terminology.  Certainly in English, but it seems to me 
also in the other modern European languages, there is a question begged in 
the very term “jurist.”  It is a noun of relatively modern construction.  The 
Romans themselves usually talked about iuris prudentes or iuris periti, 
sometimes iuris consulti.  We use jurist, whether explicitly or implicitly, to 
mean someone of high reputation, and probably high status, contrasting it 
with the wider “lawyer,” for which there is no single Latin term. 
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 1 ALAN WATSON, LAW-MAKING IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 109 (1974). 
 2 H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN 
LAW (3d ed. 1972). 
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Then there is the problem of our sources. The one attempt at historical 
treatment, Sextus Pomponius’ Enchiridion, is distinctly muddled, whether by 
the original author or by later misunderstanding, and is by no means 
reliable.4  Marcus Tullius Cicero, naturally, was interested in the legal world 
in which he played a significant part, but he was not particularly interested in 
the earlier period, and he died in 43 B.C.  Law and lawyers were not topics 
that interested the literary class, so they are as such barely mentioned by the 
Roman historians.  The compilers of the Digest of Roman Law were ordered 
to select and edit the works of all the prudentes of old to whom the emperors 
had granted authority to compose and interpret the laws, and to ignore books 
written by others whose writings had not been received or used by any later 
authors.5  The latter instruction seems to have been obeyed for, while there 
are jurists cited in the Digest of whom we know nothing more than these 
texts and their names, there are no references anywhere to other jurists of the 
Principate.  As to the former order, Republican jurists can hardly have been 
authorized by emperors, and not all the cited jurists of the Empire can have 
been so empowered.  
Whether in or as from the Twelve Tables of 451–450 B.C., it is the 
uncontested tradition that a member of the college of pontiffs, all then 
patricians, was appointed each year to be in charge of private matters, that is, 
to interpret private law.6  This was logical because early private law was 
largely concerned with the family and inheritance, and overlapped with the 
sacral law in these areas.  The pontiffs were not priests in the mystery-
religion sense, but were responsible for proper rituals; they were at the same 
time able to engage in the business of the Senate and hold magistracies, and 
as such they might also be concerned with public law.  Pontifical status 
seems sufficient to explain their authority, and why no need was seen to 
make this authority formal.  The fact that they were a college meant that 
debate was possible in new or doubtful cases.  The link between the pontiffs 
and the interpretation of law, although no longer absolute, lasted until well 
into the third century B.C.7 
Around 200 B.C. Roman history becomes less remote.  Literary sources, 
such as the plays of Plautus and the agricultural works of Cato and Varro 
survive from that time.  The first jurist whose work has survived, Sextus 
Aelius Paetus, was consul in 198 B,C.  The chief legal figures of the second 
century were Manlius Manilius, consul in 149 B.C.; M. Junius Brutus, 
praetor in 142; and Publius Mucius Scaevola, consul in 133.  A generation 
later came P. Rutilius Rufus, consul in 105 B.C.; and Quintus Mucius 
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Scaevola, son of Publius, consul in 95.  We then come to Cicero and his 
generation.  Leading figures were C. Aquillius Gallus, of equestrian family, 
praetor with Cicero in 66 B.C.; Servius Sulpicius Rufus, consul in 51, friend 
of Caesar; A. Ofilius, a lifelong eques and another friend of Caesar; A. 
Cascellius, born an eques but in office as quaestor before 73 B.C.; C. 
Trebatius Testa, protegé of Cicero and friend of Caesar and made an eques 
by Augustus who consulted him on codicils; Q. Aelius Tubero, a Pompeian 
senator reconciled with Caesar; and P. Alfenus Varus, consul in 39 B.C.  It is 
notable that most of this last group were born into equestrian, not senatorial, 
status, even Servius Sulpicius  Rufus.8 
Even with the advantage of Cicero’s evidence, romanists such as Schulz, 
Kunkel, and Jolowicz have managed to list remarkably few names for the 
180 or so years of the period before Labeo, who lived under and disagreed 
with Augustus’ supremacy.  Schulz has c. 46 names dating from Aelius 
Paetus,9 and Kunkel has 36 from Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the augur, consul 
in 117 B.C.;10 the numbers are vague because dates are uncertain.  These 
numbers may be further skewed as some of those identified as jurists should 
be classed primarily as orators, while others are very obscure.   
Is this a sufficient number of jurists to do all the development work of 
Late Republican Roman law, remembering that civil wars occupied much 
time? If not, where are we to look for other creators and interpreters of the 
law?  
The obvious place is among the scribes.11 As Schulz pointed out, “the 
aristocrat has in general little inclination for routine work.”  The pontiffs and 
magistrates were supported by a subordinate staff of secretaries and copyists.  
“Sometimes these secretaries styled themselves jurists, and quite rightly.  
Their contributions remain unrecorded . . . but we should at least remember 
their existence.”12  Scribes seem to have been free-born, and often of some 
social standing; they formed an ordo, which Cicero treated respectfully.13  G. 
Cicereius, praetor in 173 B,C,, started his public career as a scriba.14  Status 
varied among the scribes themselves, but the quaestorian scribes, who served 
the same higher magistracies as the quaestors, might well become 
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equestrians, and hold prefectures.  Pontifical scribes were classed as minor 
pontiffs.15  An undated inscription records “. . . nus iuris prudens scr[iba] 
aed[ilium] cur[ulium] v[ixit] a[nnis] LIIII.”16  Badian reconstructs 
convincingly the career of Q. Cornelius, who was scriba under Sulla and 
then quaestor under Julius Caesar, and was also described as pontifex minor; 
he is to be identified with the teacher and friend of C. Trebatius Testa.17  
Schiller argues that “most of the jurists [in the Late Republic] were of 
equestrian rank.”18  The senior scribae were men who knew their law and the 
intricacies of its practice and administration. Their status permitted 
friendship with senators.19 
Cicero, speaking through the orator Antonius, required that, for someone 
to be named a iuris consultus, he should have knowledge of the laws and 
custom used by citizens in their private affairs, and be skilled in giving legal 
opinions,20 in appearing in court, and in the drafting of legal forms for such 
things as wills or contracts21 (ad respondendum et ad agendum et ad 
cavendum).22  However, during the second century B.C. specialist orators 
largely replaced the lawyers as advocates, although it is to be remembered 
that for the Romans tertiary education was rhetoric, and the gap between 
lawyers and orators was never an abyss.  Furthermore, advice on drafting 
wills or contracts may have become less important as models were 
established and then published in writing.  The giving of opinions remained 
the quintessential function of the man skilled in law.  Teaching in this period 
was incidental, by apprenticeship as audience and follower.23  
It seems likely that in the archaic period, that is roughly before 200 B.C., 
Roman society was small enough for clientage to be the normal route for a 
small man to get legal aid and advice from a specialist.  Great men were 
expected to provide such advice, at any level of technicality, whenever they 
could be accosted, as part of their noblesse oblige.  Of course it also won 
                                                                                                                   
 15 See LIVY’S HISTORY OF ROME 22.57.3 (“scriba pontificius quos nunc minores pontifices 
appellant”). 
 16 CORPUS INSCRIPTIONUM LATINARUM VI, at 1853 (“. . . nus [a name], jurist, scribe of the 
curule aediles, lived 54 years.”). 
 17 Badian, supra note 11, at 586–89. 
 18 A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, ROMAN LAW: MECHANISMS OF DEVELOPMENT 311 (1978). 
 19 Badian, supra note 11, at 593–95.  
 20 CICERO, DE ORATORE 1.48.212.  The opinions were given to magistrates, particularly the 
Praetor, to advocates, to iudices (lay judges), and to private persons, whether or not actually 
involved in litigation. 
 21 Around 200 B.C. Varro, in his de re rustica, proposed various forms of warranty, 
including those concerned with the sale of nanny-goats.  WATSON, supra note 1, at 105.  A 
more important example is the stipulatio Aquiliana of Aquilius Gallus; although he was 
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gratia, favour, a most important component of Roman Republican political 
life, where money was not requested but obligations were planted.   
But as Rome grew, there must have been many more seeking aid and 
advice, and the great men were becoming more involved in their own power 
struggles.  It seems likely that for many matters, for many people, consulting 
the scribae would satisfy their legal needs; moreover, through their very 
jobs, the scribae gave advice to magistrates.  The scribae were essentially 
based in Rome, and as a permanent body, with written resources, were in a 
good position to provide model documents and formulae.  Indeed, there is no 
reason to doubt that they produced some legal books, since the use of vicarii 
or deputies would give them the time to write.   
With the coming of the Principate, Augustus took pains to ‘restore the 
Republic’ as far as externals went; nevertheless, as he himself stated, his 
auctoritas, his effective authority, was pre-eminent.  Kunkel argued that 
Augustus wished to restore the prestige of the lawyers.24  I see no reason to 
follow Kunkel’s view, for why should Augustus bother when it was not a 
governmental issue?  However, there was a gap to be filled, something to 
replace the political ambitions of senators when in Rome.  Law was a 
respectable and traditional way to keep in the public eye, to preserve social 
esteem.  This is sufficient to explain why senatorials seem to dominate the 
legal scene in the early Principate.  This was to change under the Flavians, at 
a time when emperors came to rely less on their own private families of 
slaves and freedmen and more on men born into the equestrian class to run 
their administration with (not for) them.  Equestrian status was no bar to 
serving on the imperial consilium; examples are Ulpius Marcellus, 
Tryphoninus, Arrius Menander.  Permanent offices were established, based 
on function rather than functionaries, and in particular, for legal purposes, 
the offices of the a libellis, the a memoria, and the a cognitionibus.  Papinian 
and Ulpian were each chiefs of the a libellis, on their routes to the Praetorian 
Prefecture.  Furthermore, we hear of salaried adsessores, consiliarii, studiosi 
iuris, men clearly of some legal expertise, and often, it seems likely, holding 
such offices as part of a career pattern, almost as training grades.  Papinian 
was adsessor to the Praetorian Prefect, as was Ulpian, and also Paul, who 
became chief of the a memoria.25  
Now, there were some sixty-four jurists listed for the 250 years or so from 
Labeo to Modestinus;26 it is surely possible to add the office chiefs, and 
maybe their immediate deputies.  I think one may safely give them an 
average career of at least twenty years.  This gives a distinctly better ratio of 
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men to years than the Republican period, particularly if one takes the figures 
Lenel gives for Republican jurists;27 moreover, it was a more peaceful time.  
It seems likely that we do have an approximate idea of the numbers of 
imperial jurists, and that there will always have been at least half a dozen 
around at any time, enough for ideas to be debated.  Jurists as we know them 
were steadily brought into the imperial service, but their standing as jurists 
seems always to have depended on peer esteem.  When they lost that 
independence, they cease to be called jurists, however much they were 
fulfilling the same functions.  It is surely significant that, although we know 
nothing of the careers of Plautius, Pomponius, Venuleius Saturninus, Gaius, 
Papirius Justus, Florentinus, Callistratus, and Tertullian (since I do not accept 
that he was identical with the theologian), they were cited by their fellows, 
with the exception of Gaius. 
The final issue I wish to consider in this rapid survey of the identity and 
role of jurists is a particular aspect of their authority.  This is a problem 
raised by the case of Sabinus, a celebrated jurist who survived into the reign 
of Nero.28  Pomponius stated that “Massurius Sabinus was of equestrian 
rank, and he first gave opinions on behalf of the public.  For after this 
privilege came to be granted, it was conceded to him by Tiberius Caesar.”29  
“To Sabinus the concession was granted by Tiberius Caesar that he might 
give opinions to the people at large.  He was admitted to the equestrian rank 
when already of mature years, almost 50.  He never had substantial means, 
but for the most part was supported by his pupils.”30  The repetition is clearly 
an example of Pomponius’ muddled exposition, but what it says is quite 
clear: Tiberius gave Sabinus a special privilege.  Raising men to equestrian 
rank as adults was certainly not unknown, for example Trebatius Testa.  
Living off one’s students was not disgraceful, although it might imply 
worldly incompetence.  If this is all we had, we might well think it 
comparable to the double salary awarded to Julian in his quaestorship by 
Hadrian.31  And indeed this is what I do think.32   
However, the waters have been very thoroughly muddied for generations 
of romanists by the intermediate sentence in Pomponius’ account:  
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 31 INSCRIPTIONES LATINAE SELECTAE 8973. 
 32 I have taken a less radical line in my THE SOURCES OF ROMAN LAW: PROBLEMS AND 
METHODS FOR ANCIENT HISTORIANS 11–13 (1997). 
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To clarify the point in passing, before the time of Augustus the 
right of stating opinions at large was not granted by emperors, 
but the practice was that opinions were given by people who 
had confidence in their own studies.  Nor did they always issue 
opinions under seal, but most commonly wrote themselves to 
the judges or gave the testimony of a direct answer to those 
who consulted them.  It was the deified Augustus who, in order 
to enhance the authority of the law, first established that 
opinions might be given under his authority.  And from that 
time this began to be sought as a favor.  As a consequence of 
this, our most excellent emperor Hadrian issued a rescript on an 
occasion when some men of praetorian rank were petitioning 
him for permission to grant opinions; he said that this was by 
custom not just begged for but earned, and that he would 
accordingly be delighted if whoever had faith in himself would 
prepare himself for giving opinions to the people at large.33 
Was there ever a ius respondendi, publice or otherwise?  Our sole 
evidence is this corrupt text from Pomponius.  The only other direct classical 
comment on juristic authority comes from Gaius:  
The opinions of the jurists are the views and advice of those to 
whom it has been permitted to build up the law.  If all their 
opinions agree, then what is so held has the force of law, but if 
they disagree, the judge may follow whichever view he wishes; 
and Hadrian indicated this in a rescript.34  
The only crux is the force of “permitted”; does it have to mean imperial 
grant?  Or is it simply imperial leave to carry on in the ordinary way?  
Otherwise Gaius is simply saying that jurisprudence is a source of law.  
Justinian, as already mentioned,35 seems to have believed that jurists must be 
specifically authorized to give responsa, but there are in the Digest plentiful 
texts from both Pomponius and Gaius, who did not, according to many 
modern romanists, issue responsa.  
Some have argued that the so-called ius respondendi means that Augustus 
gave certain jurists binding authority in their opinions.  This is hardly 
possible; neither Augustus nor Tiberius was blatant in his use of power, and 
this would have been a huge break with Republican practice.  And to what 
end?  Secondly, even if it was some sort of official approval, which would 
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indeed be likely to enhance the authority of a particular jurist, why do we 
never get any reference to it in the juristic writings?  Jurists quote each other 
frequently enough, and they clearly had full freedom to disagree with each 
other.  Linked with this is the point that certain issues had remained 
undecided until Justinian’s own day, technical issues such as whether a 
legacy with an impossible condition should be held invalid, or the condition 
struck out;36 this and other matters, as Gaius shows, remained in dispute.  
Thirdly, we have the full and clear inscription recording Julian’s career (cited 
above), and there is no mention of any such privilege.  This is negative 
evidence, and it is just possible that there was some privilege for jurists 
which was abolished by Hadrian and so not mentioned in the inscription, but 
Schulz is probably right in saying that if Hadrian had done something so 
specific we should have some record.  In Schulz’s eyes “A ius respondendi 
existed no more than a right to breathe.”37  
If, as I have been arguing, our concept of “jurist” in the Later Republic is 
inflated, if equestrians, and men below that rank, had such a considerable 
role in making law, what was so special about Sabinus?  And really special, 
because the only other text which can remotely be held as an explicit 
reference to a ius respondendi is the Greek passage cited by Schulz, which 
refers to a certain Innocentius of the time of Diocletian.38  Sabinus must have 
been given some special authority, of which the precise nature must remain 
unknown, perhaps because he had done some favor for Tiberius, but more 
likely in connection with his work as the head of one of the Schools. Indeed, 
a ius respondendi existed no more than a right to breathe. 
                                                                                                                   
 36 G. INST. 3.98. 
 37 SCHULZ, supra note 3, at 113. 
 38  Id. at 114 n.6.  He held a law-giving power – νομοθετικκην δυναμιν – conferred on him 
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